Erbil, Iraq - In a closed-door meeting in Erbil on the eve of Syria’s latest ceasefire, a familiar pattern of American foreign policy played out—one that minorities across the Middle East have learned to recognize all too well, particularly the Assyrians when betrayed by the British. According to diplomatic sources, U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack sharply rebuked Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), accusing him of attempting to “drag Israel” into Syria’s internal conflict. The warning was blunt, the message unmistakable: Washington’s patience with its former battlefield partners has limits, and those limits are dictated not by loyalty, but by shifting geopolitical convenience.
The meeting, held on Saturday and attended by veteran Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, took place as Syrian government forces advanced into territory long controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF. According to two diplomatic sources Barrack castigated Abdi for delaying a March 2025 agreement that was supposed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army by the end of 2025—an agreement that effectively marked the beginning of the end of Kurdish military autonomy in northeastern Syria.
Barrack reportedly accused the SDF leadership of stalling, failing to honor its commitments to Damascus, and relying excessively on foreign powers. Most strikingly, he warned Abdi against seeking Israeli backing, allegedly telling him: “You are trying to drag Israel into the conflict, and this will not happen.” Such a move, Barrack cautioned, would invite destruction and risk destabilizing relations between two of Washington’s key regional partners, Turkey and Israel.
For the Kurds—and for other minorities who have aligned themselves with U.S. power over the past century and were called "proxies"—the irony was unmistakable. Only a few years earlier, the SDF had been hailed in Washington as indispensable allies in the fight against the Islamic State. But now, with the geopolitical terrain shifting and Damascus once again recognized as a “partner,” the same forces were being pressured to disarm, withdraw, and submit.
Senior SDF officials have made little secret of their outreach to Israel, framing it not as provocation but as desperation. Ilham Ahmed, a prominent SDF figure, acknowledged this week that contacts existed with Israeli officials and that the SDF would welcome support “from any source” willing to help protect Kurdish communities and their political gains. In a region where survival often depends on external patronage, such pragmatism is hardly unusual—except when it collides with U.S. red lines.
Barrack’s remarks reportedly went further. He chastised Abdi for acting as though Bashar al-Assad were still in power, despite the collapse of the former regime and the emergence of a new governing authority in Damascus. “There is a fundamental change,” Barrack is said to have told him. “Damascus is our partner today in the fight against terrorism.”
The statement was revealing not only for what it said, but for what it implied. The United States, having once insisted that Assad was beyond rehabilitation, was now urging its former Kurdish allies to place their trust in a central government that had historically denied their rights and violently suppressed minority aspirations. The message echoed earlier American reversals—from the abandonment of Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War to the silence that followed the annihilation of Christian Assyrian and Yazidi communities once ISIS was militarily defeated.
Barzani, according to the same sources, struck a more cautious tone during the meeting. He reportedly described his recent engagement with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as positive, while also pressing Barrack to address credible threats facing Kurdish civilians. Barzani is said to have presented video evidence of intimidation and violence against Kurdish communities and requested U.S. assistance in ensuring their protection. He also proposed a follow-up meeting between Abdi and al-Sharaa, offering himself as a guarantor of any revised agreement.
Yet events moved swiftly. On Sunday, Damascus announced a new ceasefire with the SDF—one that effectively dismantles Kurdish-led control over northeastern Syria. Under the terms of the deal, the SDF agreed to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, relinquish border crossings, and surrender oil and gas fields that had underwritten its autonomy for more than a decade. There was no clear timetable, only assurances of gradual implementation.
Hours later, Abdi confirmed the SDF’s acceptance of the agreement, citing the need to “stop the bloodshed.” It was a statement that underscored the stark reality facing minority forces once their strategic value to global powers diminishes.
Barrack, for his part, praised the deal publicly, framing it as a step toward a “unified Syria” and lauding Damascus’s assurances that Kurds would be treated as an “integral part” of the country. The language was conciliatory, even hopeful—but to many observers, it rang hollow. Similar assurances have been extended, and broken, countless times across the region.
For Kurds, Assyrians, Yazidis, Druze, and other vulnerable communities, the lesson is once again clear. U.S. support, while often decisive in moments of crisis, remains contingent, reversible, and subordinate to broader strategic calculations. Alliances forged in war can be dissolved in diplomacy, and moral rhetoric can give way overnight to realpolitik.
The SDF’s predicament is not an aberration. It is part of a longer continuum in which minorities are encouraged to stake their survival on American backing—only to be reminded, when circumstances change, that they were never indispensable, only useful.