Introduction: A Crisis Beyond Kurdish Politics

The political confrontation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has once again exposed the fundamental weakness of the political system governing the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. What initially appeared to be a disagreement over parliamentary procedure and government formation has developed into a potentially serious institutional rupture, threatening the arrangements that have governed the region for decades.

On November 4, 2026, the Kurdistan Parliament reconvened following nearly two years of paralysis. The session proceeded with 52 of the legislature’s 100 members, despite a boycott by the PUK and other political blocs. The KDP supported the session as a legitimate exercise of parliamentary authority, while the PUK rejected the process as an attempt to impose political decisions without the necessary agreement between the region’s principal parties.

On November 5, the PUK announced its withdrawal from the regional government and threatened to establish a parallel administration. The party also reportedly considered convening a separate parliamentary session in Sulaymaniyah, administering its areas independently of Erbil, and pursuing a political arrangement that could lead to the establishment of a separate Sulaymaniyah-based regional administration. These developments represent more than a disagreement over political appointments. They raise the possibility of the Kurdistan Region returning to the divided political order that existed during the 1990s and early 2000s.

For the Assyrians of Iraq, this confrontation deserves particular attention. The Assyrian, Chaldean, and Syriac people are an indigenous population whose historical homeland includes portions of the Nineveh Plain and territories presently administered by, or claimed by, the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Their political future cannot be separated from the struggle between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

Understanding the current crisis requires examining how the two Kurdish parties emerged, why they fought, how they reconciled, and why their relationship has once again deteriorated.

I. The Origins of the KDP–PUK Rivalry

The Kurdistan Democratic Party was founded in 1946 under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani. It emerged as a principal organization of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq, advocating Kurdish political rights and autonomy.

The KDP's political identity became closely associated with the Barzani family and the party's traditional political and tribal networks, particularly in the northern Kurdish areas.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan emerged later, following the collapse of the Kurdish revolt against Baghdad in 1975. Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish political figures broke with the KDP leadership, establishing the PUK in 1975.

The division reflected ideological, organizational, and leadership disagreements. Talabani and his associates were critical of the Barzani leadership's political dominance and sought a different organizational and ideological direction. The PUK developed a stronger association with urban political networks and leftist currents, particularly in Sulaymaniyah.

Although both parties shared the objective of advancing Kurdish political rights, they increasingly developed separate leadership structures, political constituencies, and military organizations.

The distinction between the two parties was therefore not merely geographic. It reflected competing political visions, leadership traditions, and approaches to governing the Kurdish population.

Over time, however, the rivalry became increasingly centered on political power, territory, economic resources, and control of institutions.

II. The Establishment of Kurdish Self-Government and the First Division

The collapse of the Iraqi government's control over much of northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War created an unprecedented opportunity for Kurdish self-government.

Following the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein, international intervention and the establishment of a protected zone contributed to the withdrawal of Iraqi government forces from much of the Kurdish region.

In 1992, the KDP and PUK participated in elections for a regional parliament. The two parties emerged with approximately equal representation and established a power-sharing arrangement.

The resulting Kurdistan Regional Government was intended to represent a unified Kurdish political administration. The KDP and PUK divided government positions between themselves, reflecting the principle that neither party could govern effectively without the participation of the other.

But the arrangement proved fragile.

The two parties increasingly disagreed over the distribution of political authority, revenues, customs income, and territorial control. Rather than developing a unified regional administration, they continued to operate through separate party structures and competing security forces.

In 1994, their disagreements escalated into armed conflict.

The Kurdish civil war, which continued through 1997 and was formally brought to an end through the Washington Agreement of 1998, was a devastating episode in Kurdish political history. The conflict became known in Kurdish as brakuji, or “brother-killing,” reflecting the bitterness of the struggle between two movements that had originally fought for a common national cause.

The war resulted in thousands of deaths and effectively divided the Kurdish region into two administrations.

The KDP established its dominance in Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK consolidated its control in Sulaymaniyah and surrounding areas.

The parties also maintained separate military, intelligence, security, and administrative institutions.

The United States eventually brokered a peace agreement, but the settlement ended the fighting without immediately eliminating the political division. The two parties continued to govern their respective territories independently for years.

This experience is crucial to understanding the present crisis: the Kurdistan Region's political division is not a new phenomenon. It is a longstanding institutional reality that has periodically been concealed by agreements between the two parties. [1]

III. The Post-2003 Settlement: Unity in Name, Division in Practice

The American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 fundamentally transformed the political position of the Kurdish parties.

Both the KDP and PUK became important participants in the new Iraqi political system. Kurdish leaders gained significant influence in Baghdad, including senior positions in the Iraqi federal government.

The parties also sought to consolidate their regional autonomy within the new constitutional order.

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution formally recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal region with its own government, parliament, and presidency.

In 2006, the KDP and PUK reached a strategic agreement intended to consolidate their political cooperation and reunify the region's administration.

The arrangement brought the two parties together within a common regional government, dividing senior offices, ministries, and political responsibilities between them.

Yet the agreement did not eliminate the underlying division.

The KDP retained its dominant position in Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK remained dominant in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. Party-affiliated security organizations and intelligence structures continued to operate separately, and the Peshmerga forces remained divided along political lines.

The result was a peculiar political arrangement: a single Kurdistan Regional Government existed constitutionally, but its authority was exercised through two competing political centers.

The arrangement provided a degree of stability and prevented renewed armed conflict. Nevertheless, it entrenched a system in which the principal political parties effectively controlled the institutions of government.

The regional government became less an independent political institution than a framework through which the KDP and PUK negotiated their respective interests.

This arrangement has increasingly come under pressure as the parties' political interests have diverged.

Recent analysis has suggested that the strategic understanding established in 2006 has substantially weakened, leaving the region increasingly divided between the two parties' respective political and administrative spheres. [2]

IV. The 2017 Independence Referendum and the Changing Balance of Power

Another important turning point was the Kurdish independence referendum of September 2017.

The referendum, strongly promoted by the KDP leadership under Masoud Barzani, was intended to demonstrate popular support for Kurdish independence.

Although the referendum produced an overwhelming vote in favor of independence, it was rejected by Baghdad and opposed by neighboring states and major international powers.

The subsequent confrontation with the Iraqi federal government resulted in the loss of Kurdish control over Kirkuk and other disputed territories following Iraqi military operations in October 2017.

The episode demonstrated the limitations of Kurdish political power when the two parties failed to maintain a common strategic position.

The KDP's referendum initiative was widely associated with Masoud Barzani's leadership, while the PUK's position was more divided. The referendum and its aftermath intensified political disagreements between the parties and exposed the vulnerability of the region's territorial and constitutional arrangements.

For the Assyrians, the consequences were especially significant.

The disputed territories include areas of historical Assyrian settlement, particularly in the Nineveh Plain. Their political status has been affected by competing claims between Baghdad and Erbil, as well as by the changing military and administrative circumstances of the region.

The 2017 crisis reinforced the reality that the Assyrians' homeland remains vulnerable to political decisions made by larger neighboring powers.

V. The Current Crisis: A Return to Separate Administrations?

The October 2024 Kurdistan parliamentary elections produced another difficult political situation.

The KDP secured 39 seats, while the PUK won 23. The New Generation Movement obtained 15 seats, with the remaining seats distributed among other political groups.

Although the KDP emerged as the largest party, it did not obtain an outright majority.

The resulting negotiations over the formation of a new regional government became increasingly contentious.

The parliamentary session of November 4, 2026, represents the latest escalation.

With 52 lawmakers present, the parliament elected a speaker and other parliamentary officials. The KDP argued that the session was legitimate because it met the required parliamentary quorum.

The PUK rejected the proceedings, arguing that the KDP had attempted to establish a new political order without an agreement between the two principal parties.

The PUK's subsequent withdrawal from the regional government and its threat to establish a parallel administration raise the possibility of a return to the divided political system of the 1990s.

The threatened measures are particularly consequential:

• The PUK may withdraw from the regional government and other institutions.
• It may refuse to recognize parliamentary decisions made without its participation.
• It may administer its areas of influence independently of Erbil.
• It may seek to convene a separate parliamentary session in Sulaymaniyah.
• It may demand elections in its areas of influence and establish a separate legislature.
• It may seek diplomatic recognition or support for its political position.

The most serious implication is the possibility of a de facto division of the Kurdistan Region into two competing administrations.

Such a development would not necessarily constitute formal secession from Iraq. Rather, it could produce a situation in which two regional governments claim authority over different territories while continuing to operate within the Iraqi federal system.

The danger is that political disagreements could once again become institutional and territorial conflicts.

VI. The Assyrians of Iraq: Indigenous People Caught Between Competing Powers

The implications of the KDP–PUK confrontation for the Assyrians must be understood within the broader history of Assyrian political marginalization.

The Assyrians are an indigenous people of Mesopotamia with a historical presence extending across northern Iraq, including the Nineveh Plain and the mountainous areas of northern Iraq.

Their historical identity, language, religious traditions, and communal institutions predate the establishment of modern Iraq and the contemporary Kurdish political movement.

The Assyrian question is therefore not simply a question of Christian minority rights. It is also a question of indigenous identity, historical homeland, political representation, and the right to exercise meaningful self-government.

The Assyrians have experienced repeated displacement and political marginalization under successive Iraqi governments.

Under Saddam Hussein, policies of Arabization, forced displacement, and demographic manipulation affected several historically Assyrian areas, particularly in northern Iraq.

Following the collapse of Saddam's regime in 2003, Assyrians faced a new political environment characterized by competition between Baghdad and Erbil.

The Kurdistan Region offered some Assyrians opportunities for relative security and political participation. However, it also created new challenges concerning land ownership, political representation, administrative control, and the relationship between Assyrian communities and the dominant Kurdish parties.

The Nineveh Plain, in particular, became an area of competing political and territorial interests.

Its Assyrian population found itself navigating the authority of the Iraqi federal government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and various political and security organizations.

The Assyrian Democratic Movement and other Assyrian political organizations have attempted to establish an independent political voice, while the Nineveh Plain Protection Units emerged as part of efforts to defend local communities following the rise of ISIS.

These developments reflect a broader Assyrian effort to protect the community's historical homeland and political future amid the fragmentation of the Iraqi state. [3]

VII. The Problem of Assyrian Political Representation

One of the most serious problems facing the Assyrians is the question of whether their political representatives genuinely represent the community or are dependent upon the dominant Kurdish parties.

The Kurdistan Region has historically employed minority quota seats to provide representation for Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, Turkmen, and Armenian communities.

However, these arrangements have generated considerable controversy.

Assyrian activists and political organizations have repeatedly raised concerns that larger political parties can influence the election of minority representatives through electoral alliances, political patronage, and the mobilization of voters outside the minority community.

The concern is that minority representation may become a mechanism through which larger political parties exercise influence over communities whose interests are not necessarily identical to those of the dominant parties.

The reduction of minority quota representation in the Kurdistan Parliament from the previous eleven seats to five in the 2024 electoral framework further intensified these concerns.

The question is not simply how many Assyrians occupy parliamentary seats. It is whether those representatives possess the political independence necessary to advocate for Assyrian interests.

A representative who depends upon a larger party for political survival may find it difficult to oppose that party when its policies conflict with the interests of the Assyrian community.

This problem becomes particularly acute during political crises.

If the KDP and PUK divide the region into separate political administrations, Assyrian representatives could face pressure to align themselves with one party or the other.

Such a situation would undermine the possibility of an independent Assyrian political position.

The Assyrians must therefore insist that their representation be based upon the genuine political will of the community rather than the calculations of larger political parties. [4]

VIII. Article 125 and the Question of Assyrian Self-Government

The Iraqi Constitution provides an important framework for addressing the political future of indigenous and minority communities.

Article 125 states:

“The Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.”

This provision is significant because it recognizes the rights of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other communities as distinct constituents of Iraq.

However, constitutional recognition alone does not guarantee meaningful political autonomy.

The Assyrians have long advocated the implementation of Article 125 and the establishment of appropriate administrative arrangements for the Nineveh Plain.

The purpose of such arrangements would be to enable indigenous communities to exercise meaningful control over local administration, cultural affairs, education, security, and political representation.

The KDP–PUK confrontation underscores why this issue is important.

If the Assyrians remain dependent upon the political arrangements negotiated between the two dominant Kurdish parties, their future will continue to be determined by decisions made without their meaningful participation.

The constitutional rights of the Assyrians must not become subordinate to the competing territorial ambitions of Kurdish political organizations.

Nor should Assyrian political aspirations be treated as an extension of either the KDP's or the PUK's political agenda.

The Assyrian community must insist that its historical homeland and constitutional rights be addressed directly by the Iraqi federal government and through genuine Assyrian participation.

IX. Why a Kurdish Political Division Could Become an Assyrian Political Crisis

The possibility of a divided Kurdistan presents several dangers for the Assyrian community.

1. Competing claims over territory

A division between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah could create competing claims of authority over territories whose political and administrative status is already disputed.

The Nineveh Plain and surrounding areas could become subject to renewed political competition between Baghdad and Kurdish authorities.

2. Security uncertainty

The division of Kurdish security forces along party lines has historically complicated the establishment of a unified security structure.

A renewed political rupture could create uncertainty over which authorities control security in areas inhabited by Assyrians.

The Assyrians should not be expected to accept a situation in which their security depends upon the shifting political interests of competing parties.

3. Political pressure and fragmentation

The KDP and PUK may seek to secure the loyalty of Assyrian representatives, local leaders, and political organizations.

Such competition could deepen divisions within the Assyrian community itself.

The Assyrians must resist becoming instruments of Kurdish political rivalry.

4. Weakening of constitutional protections

The division of authority between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah could complicate efforts to implement Article 125 and establish meaningful administrative arrangements for the Assyrian homeland.

A fragmented political environment may create additional obstacles to the realization of Assyrian constitutional rights.

5. The danger of being overlooked

The Kurdish parties' political confrontation may attract considerable international attention, while the concerns of the Assyrians remain secondary.

This has historically been one of the community's greatest political vulnerabilities.

The Assyrians must ensure that their rights and interests are not forgotten amid the struggle for power between larger political organizations.

X. The Assyrian Position: Independence, Political Clarity, and Constitutional Rights

The Assyrian community should approach the current crisis with political clarity.

The KDP and PUK are Kurdish political organizations representing competing Kurdish political interests. Their rivalry should not be confused with the broader interests of the Assyrian people.

The Assyrians should maintain constructive relations with both parties where possible, but they must not become politically dependent upon either.

The community's principal objectives should remain:

• The protection of Assyrian historical lands and communities.
• The implementation of Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution.
• Meaningful administrative autonomy for the Nineveh Plain.
• Independent and genuine Assyrian political representation.
• Security arrangements that protect local communities and respect their political rights.
• The preservation of Assyrian language, culture, religious traditions, and historical identity.

These objectives should not be compromised by the competing political ambitions of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

The Assyrians should also recognize that their political future cannot depend exclusively upon the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The Iraqi federal government has constitutional responsibilities toward the Assyrian community and must be held accountable for implementing the rights guaranteed by the Iraqi Constitution.

The Assyrians must therefore engage both Baghdad and Erbil while maintaining an independent political position.

Conclusion: The Assyrian Homeland Must Not Become a Bargaining Chip

The current confrontation between the KDP and PUK is a reminder that the political stability of Iraqi Kurdistan has always depended upon a fragile relationship between two competing political organizations.

The two parties emerged from a common Kurdish national movement, fought a devastating civil war, established separate administrations, and eventually reconciled through power-sharing agreements.

Yet the underlying divisions were never fully resolved.

The present crisis demonstrates that the political unity of the Kurdistan Region remains vulnerable to the competing interests of its dominant parties.

For the Assyrians, the consequences could be profound.

Their historical homeland lies within a complicated political environment involving Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and other competing political and security organizations.

The Assyrians have repeatedly experienced the consequences of political decisions made by others. Their homeland has been subjected to displacement, demographic change, political marginalization, and competing territorial claims.

The present crisis should therefore serve as a warning.

The Assyrian community must not allow its political future to become a bargaining chip in the struggle between the KDP and PUK.

The Assyrians must insist upon their constitutional rights, their indigenous identity, their historical homeland, and their right to meaningful self-government.

The question is not whether the Assyrians should support Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.

The question is whether the Assyrians can finally establish an independent political position that protects their own national interests.

Their future should not be determined by the outcome of a Kurdish political rivalry.

The Assyrian homeland belongs to the Assyrian people, and its political future must be determined with their meaningful participation—not through the competing ambitions of others.