March 1, 2026

As fighting intensifies between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Professor Trita Parsi argues that the war has entered a far more dangerous and deliberate phase, one in which Tehran is no longer seeking quick de-escalation, but structural deterrence through escalation.

According to Parsi’s assessment, Iran has rejected recent ceasefire overtures from U.S. President Donald Trump not out of defiance alone, but out of strategic recalculation. Tehran believes it made a critical mistake by agreeing to a ceasefire in June. That pause, in its view, gave Washington and Israel time to replenish munitions, reorganize forces, and prepare for renewed confrontation. Accepting another ceasefire under current conditions, Iranian leaders reportedly calculate, would simply invite another round of attacks months later.

From Tehran’s perspective, a ceasefire is now only viable if the cost to Washington becomes significantly higher than it is today. Without imposing a painful and unmistakable price, Iranian officials appear to believe the United States will resume military operations at a time of its choosing.

That logic has reshaped Iran’s military posture. While Iranian forces continue striking Israel, Parsi notes that the pattern has shifted. Instead of launching large missile barrages, such as the mass salvos seen during the June fighting, Iran is maintaining a steady, continuous level of attacks throughout the day. The cumulative damage may be less dramatic, but the approach reflects a different objective. Tehran has reportedly concluded that Israel’s tolerance for sustained pain remains high so long as the United States remains fully engaged in the conflict. As a result, Iran’s strategic center of gravity has moved: the primary focus is now Washington.

From the outset of this latest escalation, Iran has targeted U.S. bases across the region, including facilities located in states traditionally considered friendly to Washington. The calculation, according to Parsi, is stark. The war will only end durably if the political and military cost to the United States rises sharply, potentially including American casualties.

The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, appears to have removed previous constraints. Iranian officials now signal that they have “no red lines” left. In this framing, the destruction of U.S. bases and the infliction of significant American losses are not peripheral tactics; they are central to altering Washington’s cost-benefit analysis.

Parsi argues that Iran is also attempting to reverse a perception within parts of the American security establishment, that Tehran’s past restraint reflected weakness or an inability to confront the United States directly. By broadening its target set and absorbing heavy damage at home, Iran appears intent on demonstrating both capability and willingness to sustain a direct conflict, even at enormous internal cost. Ironically, the killing of Khamenei may have facilitated this shift by unifying factions within the system and eliminating internal debate over escalation thresholds.

The widening battlefield underscores this transformation. Iranian strikes have reportedly targeted installations in Cyprus used in operations against Iran, signaling Tehran’s readiness to confront not only regional actors but European states. An attack on a French base in the United Arab Emirates further illustrates this expansion. Iran appears aware that striking European-linked assets risks direct confrontation with the European Union, but that may be precisely the point. If the war is to end through deterrence, Tehran’s reasoning suggests, Europe must also feel tangible costs.

Domestically, Parsi observes that Iranian authorities seem less preoccupied with internal unrest than some external analysts anticipated. The announcement of Khamenei’s death created a brief window during which public mobilization might have threatened the regime. While expressions of celebration were reported in some areas, no large-scale uprising materialized. That window appears to be closing as the theocratic establishment consolidates power and formalizes new leadership structures.

For Parsi, the central question, “How will this end?”, is one that should have preceded the outbreak of hostilities. Instead, the war was triggered without a clearly articulated off-ramp. Now, with multiple theaters expanding and escalation logic hardening on all sides, the pathways to de-escalation appear narrower than at any point since the fighting began.